Volume II No.4(26 October 2000)
Expanding Security Eastward: NATO and US Military Engagement in Georgia No.3(24 July 2000)
Once a Chekist... No.2(17 July 2000)
Shanghai Forum Calls for Efforts Against Terrorism, Extremism and Crime No.1(23 February 2000)
No Indictment for War Criminals?
Volume I No.5(14 December 1999)
Precarious Future for an Urban Minority: Ethnic Azeris in Russia No.4 (1 December 1999)
Nothing New for Moldova at Istanbul Summit No.3 (18 November 1999)
Containing the Chechen War: A new item for the OSCE agenda No.2(4 November 1999)
Is Time on the Chechen Side? -- A Military Analysis of Russia's War in Chechnya No.1 (6 October 1999)
"Dizzy with Success": Russia's Latest Maneuvers in Chechnya
Once a Chekist ...
By MIRIAM LANSKOY
The Institute For The Study Of Conflict, Ideology And Policy
Since his inauguration, Russian President Vladimir Putin has waged an ever-widening
assault on every potential source of political opposition -- the media,
the governors, big business. Although far from perfect, these institutions
do represent the rudiments of a pluralistic society, the development of
which is threatened at present by the vast powers of the presidency and
Putin's growing reliance on the security forces.
Some recent commentary on Russian politics no longer stigmatizes an association
with the bloodiest organization in human history. Quite the opposite: Joining
the KGB is likened to studying at a prestigious American university -- the
natural destination for the brightest and best.
Some have gone far beyond such comparisons, arguing as Tatiana Tolstaya
did in her review of Putin's biography (May 10 issue of the New York Review
of Books, p. 10) that KGB oversight was indispensable for democratic governance.
"At a time when everyone was in a rush to declare his changed views,
Putin remained true to the discipline of the Corporation," she writes
approvingly. "One can only think that his unprecedented rise to the
position of deputy mayor under Sobchak meant that the Corporation trusted
him with this high position, anticipating that the inexperienced democrats
were likely to botch things up."
In its flight of fantasy about the wise KGB agents looking out for the social
good, the review neglects to analyze the book in question, which contains
some very interesting insights into Putin's unapologetically chekist views,
the implications of which are now becoming operational.
AFGHANISTAN
Putin was a KGB agent for 16 years, from 1975 to 1991. He first became interested
in this work as a teenager after seeing the movie "Sword and Shield"
which glorified Russian spies. Having recently joined the KGB, the young
idealistic Putin, whose feelings for everything connected with the war in
Afghanistan are "one big hurrah!," meets a more seasoned colleague
who has returned from a tour there.(1) Putin asks the agent how he would
judge the results of his work. The man responds that he judges his own performance
by the quantity of documents he didn't sign. Putin explains that every bombing
mission required the signature of a KGB agent. (p. 61)
Putin uses this anecdote to paint his fellow spies as the advance guard
of liberal reforms, but a different point is of greater import: If KGB officers
in Afghanistan were overseeing military operations, this is an astounding
revelation. The institution of political commissars had been eliminated
after World War II, and even then the political officer looking over the
shoulder of the military commander was a representative of the party, not
of the KGB. It could be that Putin is mistaken and the KGB did not have
that degree of responsibility for military operations in Afghanistan, but
the very fact that this level of KGB intrusion can be presented in such
an offhand way raises a related issue: Last February, when Putin's decree
assigned FSB agents to every military unit in Chechnya, what role did he
grant them? Are those agents performing counterintelligence or are they
there in a decision-making capacity?
STASI
The chapter devoted to Putin's stay in the GDR is the most emotionally and
politically charged part of the book. Consider the gulf between the sensibility
of most reformers and that of the Putins revealed in the following comment
from Vladimir's wife, Ludmilla: "[W]hen the Berlin wall was being destroyed
and it became evident that this is the end, there was this terrible feeling,
that the country which almost had become your own would no longer exist."
(p. 68)
While Ludmilla grieved over the passing of the GDR, Vladimir pitied the
fate of his Stasi colleagues to whom he was deeply devoted. Even when he
became the deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, he used the position to lobby
in their interest by warning the German consul, "Keep in mind that
I am getting letters, these are my personal contacts. I understand you have
a campaign against former state security agents -- they are hounded for
political reasons -- but they are my friends and I will not abandon them."
(p. 67)
Putin comments that the GDR was decades behind the Soviet Union in its rigid
adherence to communism but later he had to watch, powerless and furious,
as this seemingly doctrinaire society undid the police state, disbanded
the Stasi, and imposed lustration laws. Seeing his Stasi chums suffer public
humiliation, Putin considered the odds of having to undergo a similar fate.
ST. PETERSBURG ADMINISTRATION
Shortly after his return to St. Petersburg, Putin, whose credentials don't
seem to have any particular relevance to city administration, applied for
a position with Anatoly Sobchak's team at the urging of an unidentified
acquaintance. Putin barely knew Sobchak, although he took the mayor's course
at the law department of St. Petersburg University. The "corporate"
representative presented himself at Sobchak's office, explained that he
was on staff with the KGB, asked for a job with the mayor, and was hired
on the spot. (pp. 78-79)
At present, we have no way of evaluating the accuracy of that story, but
what we are being asked to believe is fairly incredible: That it is entirely
natural for one of Russia's leading democrats to hire a chekist as his right-hand
man. At the same time Putin suggests that some members of Sobchak's team
were uncomfortable with Putin's KGB employment and had threatened to expose
him. This prompted Putin to disarm his opponents skillfully by making a
televised disclosure.(2) Putin portrays these opponents, the persons trying
to keep a chekist out of the city government, as corrupt, intolerant, and
opportunistic.
AUGUST COUP
Then came the August 1991 coup attempt, which dissolved against the wave
of democratic enthusiasm. These events gave Putin the jitters. "Do
you remember the situation in which the security organs found themselves
then? That wave wanted to destroy [the KGB], break [it] apart, rip [it]
to shreds. There were suggestions to open up the lists of agents, to declassify
files. " (p. 129) Putin's savior was a democratic figure, a former
policeman, Sergei Stepashin, who became the new head of the St. Petersburg
FSK (heir to the KGB and predecessor to FSB). "Stepashin behaved in
a completely unexpected way. In effect, he used his democratic credentials
to shield the security services," thereby winning Putin's eternal gratitude.(3)
The storm passed, "our Cheka" remained intact, and Putin survived
to repay his debts. When Putin was working in the presidential administration
he suggested that Stepashin be appointed justice minister. When Putin became
president, he nominated Stepashin to be the head of the Audit Chamber--
a nightstick with which to beat the oligarchs.
NOTES:
(1) All the quotes represent my translations from Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory
c Vladimirom Putinym (Moskva: 2000); the page numbers refer to the Russian
book. The Russian text can be obtained from www.vagrius.com. There is an
English translation available in bookstores by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick,
First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President
Vladimir Putin.
(2) The incident recalls an earlier passage in the book where Putin describes
how the KGB would undermine dissident activists by preempting them. The
KGB would sponsor an event identical to the one the dissidents were planning,
thereby robbing the dissident event of any news value. (pp. 43-44)
(3) Putin also mentions personalities who obstructed the progress of his
career. In 1996 Putin needed a job because Sobchak had lost the gubernatorial
elections. First, he was promised a diplomatic post but this fell through,
apparently due to Yevgeni Primakov's hesitations. (p. 110) As foreign minister
and previously head of Russia's foreign intelligence, Primakov would have
been able to obtain and evaluate Putin's professional record. That rejection
must have hurt. Subsequently, Nikolai Yegorov, then-head of the president's
administration, intended to make Putin his deputy. But Yegorov was removed
before he could make good on the promise and his replacement, Anatoli Chubais,
eliminated the position.(p. 120) Of course, Putin professes to hold no grudges.