On 11 December, Iraq's oil ministry announced that it had terminated
the contract with LUKoil to develop the West Qurna oil field, one
of the biggest fields being offered to foreign oil companies (7.3 billion
barrels of recoverable reserves). Iraq charged that LUKoil had failed
to fulfill its obligations under the agreement, which was signed in 1997,
and "since the Contract was signed with the sole purpose of developing
and producing from the West Qurna field to augment the oil production capacity
of Iraq, the non-performance by LUKoil had in effect resulted
in substantial harm to the economic interests of the country." (Energy
Intelligence Group, Inc., NEFTE COMPASS, 11 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis)
LUKoil responded that its inability to develop the fields resulted from
the ongoing UN sanctions regime. In fact, Russian companies do not face
this problem alone. Companies from several other countries -- France, Italy
and China, among them -- hold contracts that are not operational because
of the sanctions, which were in place before the agreements were reached.
(THE TIMES (London), 12 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis)
As for Moscow's reaction, there have been some calls for changing the
nature of the Russo-Iraqi relationship. Valery Draganov, chairman of the
Duma's Economic Policy Committee, called Iraq an "unstable partner"
on 14 December. "In addition to the economic aspect, we should ask
ourselves the question whether we can continue sitting on two chairs,"
Draganov said, according to Interfax. "We are backing the U.S.-led
anti-terrorist operation and simultaneously giving hope to a regime, cooperation
with which offers no economic prospects and poses a threat of betrayal."
(ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, 14 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) Whether this
call will be heeded by the Kremlin remains an open question.
DOMESTIC ISSUES AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Center does not favor attempts at independence
Speaking to the presidium of the state council that is charged with
examining and improving the division of responsibilities between the federal
center and the regions, President Putin said opaquely that a "renewed
legal basis is required for reinforcing independence and increasing responsibility,
both of regional and of local authorities." (ITAR-TASS, 1431 GMT,
21 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1121, via World News Connection) Some regional
leaders appear to be taking the notion of "independence" quite
seriously, ignoring earlier indications that the administration's notion
of reform more closely resembles reinforcement of the "power vertical,"
that is, federal control over the regions.
Establishing a level of autonomy, however, is no easy task. Despite
the support of Bashkir President Murtaza Rakhimov, deputies in Bashkortostan's
assembly voted unanimously against changing the system of regional government
from the presidential to the parliamentary type. (ITAR-TASS, 1217 GMT,
3 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1203, via World News Connection) An earlier draft
of a new constitution had eliminated the post of president (with presidential
powers being shared by the government and the legislature) and had raised
the status of the speaker of parliament. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 18 Oct 02)
The notion of parliamentary republics had garnered support outside Bashkortostan
as well. "There should only be one president in the country -- the
president of the Russian Federation," Mukhu Aliev, chairman of Daghestan's
parliament, said. Head of parliament should be the highest post in the
national republics, he added. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 11 Oct 02)
Not everyone agreed. Ramazan Abdulatipov, a member of the Federation
Council, applauded the results of the Bashkortostan vote while warning against
similar endeavors. "[A]ttempts to introduce a parliamentary model
for forming the organs of power in some places contradict the constitutionally
determined common principles governing their formation and activity. This
introduces elements of incompatibility, of certain kinds of contradiction
into the functioning of the organs of power at the center and at the local
level, and hence leads to destructiveness and instability," he said.
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 4 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1204, via World News Connection)
Abdulatipov stressed that he did not understand the motivation prompting
Rakhimov and "certain circles in Udmurtia" to try and change the
present system.
Udmurtia isn't limiting its anti-federal behavior to political change,
either. Despite a six-year-old decision by Moscow to build a disposal site
for 916 defunct solid-fuel rocket engines, the leader of Udmurtia's government,
Yuri Pitkevich, recently signed a decree nullifying all previous statutes
concerning construction at that location. The move reportedly was sparked
by environmental concerns about the disposal process, which includes burning
the engines and then cleaning up the residue. An article in the government
newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta minced no words in analyzing this situation:
Casting aside arguments for clean air, it called Pitkevich's actions "a
flagrant act of regional sabotage against decisions made by the central
government," and warned that the federal government had no current
"legal grounds to make regional leaders toe the line," at least
until the US withdraws funding. Then, it pointed out, the disposal would
go on, without the technology US money could have brought. (ROSSIYSKAYA
GAZETA, 6 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1206, via World News Connection)
Pitkevich's move does risk the loss of US funding for the destruction
of weapons arsenals and makes questionable Russia's adherence to international
agreements. Interestingly, Udmurtia had not been the government's first
choice for the disposal site. Originally, the plan was to use an existing
facility in Perm Oblast', but Moscow had to seek an alternative when the
head of that oblast's administration refused to allow it. Consideration
of a similar site in Kemerovo Oblast' also has encountered opposition from
environmentalists. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 15 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1115, via
World News Connection)
Another item of contention between the center and the national republics
is as basic as the alphabet: Latin or Cyrillic. Both sides are trying to
position their arguments within the context of saving a national culture,
either existent or emergent. In a letter to President Putin, Talgat Tadzhuddin,
Russia's supreme mufti, expressed his negative opinion of attempts to introduce
the Latin alphabet for Tatarstan's national language. "Changing the
basics of a language in one of Russia's subjects would bring about irreversible
damage to all of Tatar ethnic culture and to the community of Russian peoples
and would lead to distrust towards and alienation from them," he said.
The mufti is not alone. Representatives of the Tatar diaspora in Bashkortostan
also wrote of their concerns: "Changing our written language would
lead to the isolation of the whole Tartar people, including those residing
in Tatarstan itself, from Russian culture and its priceless heritage."
(ITAR-TASS, 0830 GMT, 9 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1209, via World News Connection)
The change was supported by Russia's Duma, which decided to make use
of the Cyrillic alphabet mandatory in an amendment to the Law on the Languages
of the Peoples of the Russian Federation. (INTERFAX, 0852 GMT, 15 Nov 02;
FBIS-SOV-2002-1115, via World News Connection) The World Tatar Congress
has urged Putin not to sign the amended law. "The approval of the
amendment by the parliament infringes on the people's inviolable rights.
Making a state decision on the language of an ethnic group without taking
its opinion into account is an unprecedented occurrence," the appeal
to Putin said. (INTERFAX, 1830 GMT, 2 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1202, via World
News Connection) Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiev declared the Duma's
move to be unconstitutional, and asserted that such a law would not be enforced
in Tatarstan. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 19 Nov 02)
Tatarstan is not the only republic looking to use the Latin alphabet,
however. Ethnic communities in the northern republic of Karelia also protested
the Duma's decision. Such a move, according to a letter made public by
the Karelian government, "will fully ruin the emerging Karelian and
Vepps languages that are close to the Finnish language." (ITAR-TASS,
0039 GMT, 11 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1211, via World News Connection)
by Kate Martin (kmmartin@bu.edu)
ARMED FORCES
Russian forces race to Kyrgyzstan to maintain balance of power
Moscow finally is fighting back against what it perceives to be an insidious
increase in America's presence and influence in the Central Asian region.
On 2 December, two Su-25 Frog-Foot ground attack aircraft and two Il-76
Candid transport aircraft arrived at the military airport in Kant, 20 kilometers
from Bishkek. Over the next few weeks, five Su-27, five Su-25 fighter aircraft,
two AN-26 Curl transport aircraft, five L-39 trainers, two Mi-8 Hip multi-mission
helicopters and two Il-76 aircraft will join the initial arrivals. Over
700 Russian servicemen and civilians from Tajikistan also will be transferred
to Kant to man this hardware. (INTERFAX, 1219 GMT, 2 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis)
The Russian military attaché in Kyrgyzstan, Major General Vladimir
Varfalameev, told news agencies that this move is meant to provide air cover
for the ground units which have been set up at Kant already, and that the
units comprise Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik battalions. He went on
to say that this increased presence is part of a continuing effort to bolster
Central Asia's collective rapid-deployment forces for the Collective Security
Treaty's Central Asian sector (CSTO). (ITAR-TASS, 0947 GMT, 2 Dec 02; via
Lexis-Nexis)
But the timing and method of this move indicate a different objective.
President Vladimir Putin may be more interested in sending a none-too-subtle
message to the region than to bolster CSTO. This Russian activity comes
on the heels of Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmonov's announcement that
he would visit the United States in December to discuss an increased American
military presence adjacent to current Russian units based in Dushanbe.
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 Nov 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging
Markets Database) Of additional concern to Putin are the squadrons of planes
and soldiers from NATO which have been stationed at the Manas airfield in
Kyrgyzstan for over a year. That may be a further reason why he announced
the move of military force into the region and why he arrived in Kyrgyztan
on 5 December to visit the troops and see the situation first-hand. (KOMMERSANT,
2 Dec 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
However, moving a 700-soldier unit from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan, an insignificantly
small distance, does nothing to increase military capability in the area.
It equates to little more than a shell game to make it appear that a significant
military presence is being established. (NEZAVISIMOYE VOENNOYE OBOZRENIE,
9 Dec 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
This "hollow" gesture by Putin might be explained by a recent
Russian survey. The results, published by the Russian Academy of Sciences'
Institute for Comprehensive Social Research (ICSR), indicate that Russians
dislike any US military presence in former Soviet territory and approve
overwhelmingly Putin's use of Russian troops to counter such a presence.
On the other hand, the study found that most Russians believe Putin's greatest
achievement of the past two years was "unfreezing" Russia's relations
with the West. (IZVESTIA, 8 Oct 02; via The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press) These results could explain why, while Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
recently indicated that Russia no longer views one country as its principal
antagonist, at the same time Putin shuffles troops around Central Asia to
make it appear that Moscow is countering the US presence. (VEDOMOSTI, 3
Dec 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
In the final analysis, the Russian military is in such poor shape, and
stretched so thin because of Chechnya, that no new military force could
be generated to increase the Collective Security Treaty Organization's ranks
in Kyrgyzstan. The most that Moscow could do was to shuffle military forces
within the region. This constituted an unimpressive effort to boost Putin's
popularity and to send a message to the Central Asian states that they remain
within Russia's orbit, even as Moscow's influence continues to deteriorate
along with its economic and military might.
Putin's visit to China and India strengthens military ties
President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to East Asia and Central Asia
had a clear goal: To increase military sales to everyone who will buy.
As an example, during his time in India he endorsed more than 350 draft
contracts for military support. According to Andrei Nikolaev, head of the
Russian State Duma Defense Committee, Russia will "deliver new military
hardware and weapons to India and modernize the existing types of weapons,
launch production of T-70 and T-90 tanks and Su-30MKI aircraft, and develop
joint production of advanced types of hardware and arms." (ITAR-TASS,
3 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis)
Additionally, these 350 contracts include production of Amur-1650 submarines,
radio electronic countermeasures systems for Su-30MKI aircraft, Smerch multiple
launchers, airborne early warning systems for the A-50 aircraft and the
modernization of the heavy aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian
Navy. (ITAR-TASS, 1917 GMT, 2 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) Of most concern
to India's neighbors is Russia's renewed offer to provide an integrated
air and missile defense system that President Putin offered in New Delhi.
The long-range S-300V surface-to-air missile system, along with the shorter-range
"Tor-M1" and "Buk-M1" systems, will be integrated into
the Indian "Trishul" system and would cover the entire Indian
territory. (THE ECONOMIC TIMES, 1 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) According to
Rosoboronexport, the contracts signed with India total about $12.5 billion,
no small amount of money for a Russian military and economy in desperate
need of cash. (INTERFAX, 1331 GMT, 28 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1128, via World
News Connection)
The same dynamic was evident in China. China added the S-300F surface-to-air
missile system to its inventory along with several naval acquisitions.
According to Konstantin Makienko, deputy director of the Russian Center
for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, China has arrived at a qualitatively
new stage in development of its navy. "The Chinese navy is making
active steps to access the medium ocean zone," he said. This capability
would allow operation outside the first chain of islands (e.g., Japan, Taiwan
and western Borneo). (ITAR-TASS, 0950 GMT, 25 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1125,
via World News Connection)
Military sales to China and India keep the two giants on equal military
ground. When asked about the arms race he is fueling, President Putin said,
"We are confident about the positive development of Russian-Indian,
Russian-Chinese and Chinese-Indian relations We look favorably on the possibility
of India joining the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO). We have come
to the conclusion that now we could address other problems through that
organization." The SCO originally included four former Soviet republics
and China to resolve border disputes but has expanded its role to include
"fighting terrorism." (PRIME-TASS, 2 Dec 02; WPS Defense and
Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
Despite President Putin's claim that no arms race can take place among
friends, China and India still have a long way to go before they look upon
one another without suspicion. In the meantime, Moscow obtains what it
wants from both countries: money to help revitalize a failing economy and
reform a struggling military.
by Steve Kwast (kwast@bu.edu)
* * * *
Ukraine update
In the last edition of The NIS Observed, (4 Dec 02) the downing of a
Russian passenger jet by Ukrainian air defense troops in October 2001was
mentioned in relation to an upcoming joint Russian-Ukrainian exercise.
The aircraft, a Russian Tu-154, crashed into the Black Sea, killing all
66 passengers and 12 crewmembers. (INTERFAX-UKRAINE, 1156 GMT, 3 Dec 02;
via Lexis-Nexis) It now appears that an attempt may be made to raise the
airliner, which lies nearly 2,000 meters deep on the bottom of the Black
Sea. Remnants of the plane are necessary to "prove the guilt of officials
who violated the rules during the exercise," according to the Ukrainian
deputy prosecutor-general in charge of military prosecution, Oleksander
Atamanyuk. At present no officials of the Ukrainian defense ministry have
been charged, though it is widely accepted that an S-200 air defense missile
fired by Ukraine air defense troops brought down the aircraft. (ITAR-TASS,
3 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis)
Russian prosecutors have provided assistance in the matter; however,
the evidence they submitted did not include any pieces of the aircraft or
missile. By raising the debris of the aircraft along with any remains of
the passengers, investigators will have "the entire chain of evidence
and be able to state that the jetliner had been destroyed by a missile,
and prove the guilt of the military," said Atamanyuk. (NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA, 9 Dec 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database)
Russian defense ministry leadership rumors
The apparent bureaucratic power struggle between Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov and Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin has prompted considerable
open discussion in military circles. The latest rumor, according to one
recent article, is that one of the two men will leave the defense ministry
in the near future. The military believes that Kvashnin has the best chance
to remain and perhaps even ascend to the position of defense minister.
Kvashnin's supporters point to his recent atypical participation in the
high-profile political meetings of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
and Russia-NATO Council. He also has made himself much more accessible
to journalists of late and is in line for promotion to marshal of the Russian
Federation. Other sources cited in the article say that Kvashnin is permitted
to phone President Putin personally without first informing the defense
minister and at times even receives calls from him. Now that the return
of the red star to the military's combat banners has been approved, the
military believes that there should be little or no embarrassment to returning
a military officer to the position of defense minister. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI,
2 Dec 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) On
the other hand, the relations between Putin and Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov are widely believed to be based on personal friendship developed
during their FBS career.
Another Russian general also may be receiving a new assignment, though
certainly not the kind that leads to higher rank or a more prestigious position.
Colonel General Gennadi Troshev, currently commander of the North Caucasus
Military District, is rumored to be in line for a transfer to head the Siberian
Military District. Until this surprising news, Troshev appeared to have
bright military and political prospects. He had fought in both Chechen
campaigns and had been responsible for some of the more successful operations.
Troshev now occupies one of the most important positions in the military,
the position held by Kvashnin in 1997. Most recently Troshev has been mentioned
as a potential candidate for governor of the wealthy Rostov region or president
of Chechnya. However, indications are that Troshev may be facing the same
career danger that has befallen prior commanders of the Chechen campaigns,
who have been relegated to positions of obscurity. Another factor mentioned
is Troshev's self-serving book about his time in Chechnya titled "My
War: The Chechnya diary of a general in the trenches." While it may
have led to a rise in his political status, the book also has earned the
resentment of many top military officers. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 10 Dec 02;
What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Should Troshev
try to fight the reassignment, he would be well advised to avoid rides in
helicopters and steer clear of long car trips.
Russian Duma approves military budget
In its third reading the Russian Duma has approved the national budget
for 2003. A fourth and final reading remains; however, this is largely
considered to be a formality. Included in the budget are 345 billion rubles
(approximately US $10.8 billion) for the military. In a recently published
interview, Colonel General Yuri Rodionov, a former defense minister and
now a member of the Duma defense committee, stated that the amount for the
military had grown by 62 billion rubles over last year's budget. However,
according to Rodionov, when adjusted for inflation, it is only a 0.15% increase
from the 2002 budget. Of the 345 billion rubles budgeted, he said, 326
billion are allocated for construction and maintenance, 13 billion will
go to the defense ministry's nuclear energy program and 4 billion will be
spent on mobilization and reserve training. Rodionov criticized the budget
for not providing enough money to continue the present rate of dismantling
nuclear submarines and for not factoring in expected increases in transportation
and energy costs. According to Rodionov, removal of spent fuel will drop
from 18 submarines per year to only 6 and spending on modernization will
have to be sacrificed to compensate for a 5 billion ruble shortfall for
transportation and fuel expenditures. (NEZAVISIMOYE VOENNOYE OBOZRENIE,
6 Dec 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database)
Of significant concern to other members of the Russian Duma is the lack
of funding directed to the well-being of service members. While small increases
are stipulated for salaries and allowances, other items of compensation
were nowhere near the amounts necessary. Money assigned to cover the costs
of food is sufficient to supply the equivalent of only 67% of all service
members. Instead, members will receive compensation of 20 rubles per day
(less than US $1). Money allocated to pay for housing, medical care and
relocation of service members is half of that required. The budget also
states that members will be supplied only with field uniforms.
Other budget shortages also continue to plague the Russian military.
Lack of flight time for pilots and sailing time for Navy ships will erode
not only individual service member's capabilities but also overall satisfaction
with the military. And, in perhaps the biggest defense ministry initiative,
the failure to provide adequate salaries has put the transition to a contract
military in serious doubt. When viewed together, these shortfalls make
it obvious that without significant reductions in force size, Russia's military
budget will be unable to supply the materials and compensation necessary
to sustain a viable fighting force. (WPS OBSERVER, 4 Oct 02; What the
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database)
by Dan Rozelle (drozelle@bu.edu)
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES
WESTERN REGION
BELARUS
Leaving the back door open
The United States joined the travel ban issued by 14 European Union countries
to eight top Belarus officials (including President Alyaksandr Lukashenka)
on 26 November, citing a shared concern over Belarus' treatment of its citizens:
"The United States imposes this extraordinary measure in view of the
continuing erosion of human rights and democratic principles in Belarus."
(WWW.USIS.MINSK.BY)
The travel ban also had been explicitly linked to the October closure
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission
in Minsk. (Portugal, which holds the current OSCE presidency, had not joined
the ban in view of its hosting the recent 55-nation OSCE talks.) On 2 December,
Dutch EU delegate Jan Marinus Wiersma stated that if an agreement was reached
about an OSCE presence in Belarus, the EU would be able to lift the travel
ban.
Lukashenka welcomed discussion of the issue: "We are ready to personally
invite to our country all those -- even if there are 100 of them -- [empowered]
for talks on the mandate of an OSCE mission, on the forms and terms of its
presence." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 5 Dec 02) This honor was not extended
on that same day, however, to two experts -- one Romanian, one Czech --
who had planned to take part in a conference in Minsk on democratic election
standards. Their failure to receive a visa most probably was in response
to the Czech refusal to issue a visa to President Lukashenka to attend the
Prague NATO summit in November.
Lukashenka uttered his statement during what was, for him, a highly surprising
visit on 3-4 December with three US Congressmen. The stop in Minsk, initiated
by an invitation from President Lukashenka to the Congressmen who were on
their way to Moscow, appears at this time like an unfortunate break in the
US resolve towards the current Belarus regime. Still, this meeting may have
contributed to Lukashenka's swift response allowing OSCE participants back
into the country. Not surprisingly, the regime also used the visit for propagandistic
purposes, with a press release asserting that the Congressmen had called
the highly controversial 2001 presidential election in Belarus fair and
democratic and had emphasized their readiness to establish contact with
the Belarus legislature. The Belarus opposition, which also met with the
Congressmen, was appalled at this "cheap propaganda." A member
of the US delegation, Rep. Curt Weldon, expressed surprise at the government's
move: "I am appalled that anyone would take such blatant action and
put out such outrageous liesThe delegation went to Minsk in good faith and
what they have seen is the lowest form of politics." (WWW.USIS.MINSK.BY)
Against the background of Putin's invitations to Lukashenka and intensified
talks on the development of a union between Russia and Belarus, as well
as the growing economic power Russia holds over struggling Belarus (particularly
evident at the moment in the gas sector), Lukashenka looks increasingly
dependent on the Russian president. It may be useful, therefore, for the
representatives of the EU and US not to slam shut Belarus' door to the West.
The best vehicle for continued dialogue appears to be the efforts at reopening
OSCE relations.
Talks between Belarus and OSCE have begun tentatively at the level of
the Belarus ambassador to Austria Viktor Haysyonak, who is also the permanent
representative to the OSCE, and representatives of the OSCE Permanent Council
and Secretariat. The Belarus authorities have expressed their hope that
the talks might yield results by the end of the year. (ITAR-TASS, 12 Dec
02; via Lexis-Nexis) Officials on both sides denied rumors that discussions
had not even begun yet, but warned that the issues at hand will take more
than a few days to be resolved. In the meantime, Norway also has issued
an identical travel ban.
UKRAINE
Some new, old faces
President Leonid Kuchma has spent his time since the parliamentary election
turning around the results and consolidating his position with surprising
ease. As it stands now, the pro-presidential majority in the Rada has 233
deputies, increased again after some recent defections from the Our Ukraine
faction. With his new prime minister, Kuchma is balancing the power of
the clans and has set himself up for what would seem to be a safe two-year
run to a comfortable retirement.
Many new faces have appeared in high positions during recent weeks, including
Yuriy Kravchenko, who on 6 December found himself unexpectedly the head
of the Ukrainian State Tax Administration. One of Kuchma's supporters,
he had lost his position as Minister of the Interior in the course of the
Gongadze scandal. The new head of the Supreme Court, Vasyl Malyarenko,
was elected in November, shortly after the first of two court cases against
President Kuchma were filed in Kyiv. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 30 Oct 02) The
judge who had opened and presented the two cases against the president,
Yuriy Vasilenko, has declared that he is concerned not only for his own
position and safety, but for the safety of his family, suspecting that he
is under surveillance. (EKSPRES, 5 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging
Markets Database) Oleksandr Lavrynovich, the new justice minister, has
stated that Vasilenko's cases discredit the judge's professionalism. He
reiterated also that the secretly recorded Melnychenko tapes are not permissible
as evidence in any court case. (KIYEVSKIY TELEGRAF, 9 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring,
via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
The opposition is now fighting against the dismissal of Volodymyr Stelmakh,
governor of the Ukrainian National Bank. Kuchma made his third request for
the governor's dismissal on 12 November, after earlier attempts had failed
in parliament. Stelmakh signed a resignation letter that same day, though
it later emerged that the letter was written under considerable pressure.
The opposition is taking a strong stance on this case. Opposition leader
Viktor Yushchenko stated on 15 November that Stelmakh "is our last
fortress and we shall not retreat." (UNIAN, 15 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring,
via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
The opposition has been strongly critical of many recent appointments,
pointing particularly to the new cabinet's lack of popular legitimacy.
Oleksandr Moroz stated that "What we have witnessed is a new stage
of redistributing the country among oligarchic clans. Under the president's
guidance, the Kyiv, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk clans have struck a compromise.
The president and his team are refining the oligarchic model of forming
a government." (INTERFAX, 2 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1202, via World
News Connection)
Viktor Yanukovych and leaders of the pro-presidential majority on 7 December
signed a "Political Accord on Cooperation and Joint Responsibility"
in exercising power, (INTERFAX, 7 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1207, via World
News Connection) which Kuchma praised, pointing to the political consolidation
which he said had not been seen previously at the beginning of a new cabinet.
He underlined the necessity of unity in action between the cabinet, the
parliament and the president, saying that he would no longer be able to
correct the "populist mistakes" made by the Supreme Rada and that
he placed his trust now in the work of the coalition government and the
parliament. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1207, via World News Connection)
This new situation does indeed have the appearance of a much-strengthened
Kuchma bloc at all levels of the administration.
Undoubtedly, the developments during the last month have made the opposition's
work more difficult, as their role in the Rada has been increasingly sidelined.
Moreover, considerable pressure is being exerted on all opposition figures,
both professionally and personally.
Given such measures, it is not entirely surprising to see some politicians
crumble. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine is losing parliamentarians at a worrying
rate. On Tuesday, 10 December, reacting to the defection of a group of
five parliamentarians, Yushchenko said that members of the Our Ukraine faction
have been under higher-than-ever criminal and political pressure. He denounced
those who joined the pro-presidential faction as having betrayed the voters
of Our Ukraine, and said that he would appeal to the electorate not to forget
those names. One of the defectors is Oleksandr Stoyan, head of the Federation
of Trade Unions, another important figure for Kuchma. Our Ukraine now has
only 103 deputies in parliament.
Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Moroz and Petro Symonenko are continuing
their opposition to President Kuchma. On 4 December, they announced the
continuation of the "Rise Up, Ukraine!" campaign, set to enter
into a new phase which they titled "Releasing Ukraine from Kuchma."
They stated that they would soon begin touring the regions again, and announced
a nationwide strike for 9 March 2003. "We are convinced that an open
national protest of this sort against the authorities will provide sufficient
reasons for Kuchma to resign and, after all, to stop discrediting the country
and the people," they said. (INTERFAX, 4 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1204,
via World News Connection) After some doubt in the last few weeks whether
the Our Ukraine bloc also would be able to come to an agreement with the
other three opposition factions, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko issued a call
for a united front. (UNIAN, 14 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging
Markets Database)
Not only the political world is experiencing pressures from the top.
Journalism has not been an easy or particularly safe profession in Ukraine
for quite some time, but in recent months, things appear to have become
even more difficult. The case of Mikhailo Kolomiets, who disappeared in
late October and was discovered hanged in a Belarus forest, remains unsolved
and disputed. Ukrainian and European media watchdogs issued an appeal on
13 December, calling on European institutions to protect Ukrainian journalists
and to insist on a proper investigation into the Kolomiets case.
by Nadezda Kinsky (nkinsky@bu.edu)
* * * * *
MOLDOVA
Reintegration or stagnation?
On the heels of the November 2002 OSCE acknowledgement that Russia would
fail to meet the previously established deadline for removal of some 40,000
tons of ammunition and 2,500 soldiers from the disputed Transdniestr region
of Moldova, (THE NIS OBSERVED, 4 Dec 02) the Moldovan parliament approved
President Vladimir Voronin's request to create a new post of Minister of
Reintegration. An amendment to Moldovan law states that "the minister
for Moldovan reintegration will promote and coordinate government policy
on reintegration," although the legislation (clearly aimed at the breakaway
region of Transdniestr and the increasingly separate Gagauz area) does not
specifically mention either region by name. (BASAPRESS, 12 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1206,
via World News Connection)
Less than a week after the announcement of the new ministerial position,
Moldovan Foreign Minister Nikolai Dudeu appeared unable to exude much optimism
with regard to putative progress in the resolution of the Transdniestr question.
Following a series of OSCE meetings in the Portuguese city of Porto, Dudeu
called the talks a failure, and then proceeded to place blame for the lack
of progress during the summit squarely on the leadership in Tiraspol. Dudeu
went on to add, "Proceeding from this situation, the Moldovan leadership
believes that only the adoption of coercive measures (political and economic)
can make the Dniestr leaders resume the negotiating process." (ITAR-TASS,
10 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1210, via World News Connection)
In contrast to the tone set by Dudeu, President Voronin's press service
proceeded to inform the media that he had "positively assessed"
the results of the OSCE summit in Porto. Voronin's apparent optimism was
somewhat surprising in that, as a result of the summit, the deadline for
Russia to remove its ammunition and 2,500-strong "guard force"
had been extended to December of 2003. (INFOTAG, 10 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1210,
via World News Connection) Apart from Voronin's rosy outlook, prospects
for Russian compliance with the newly set deadline do not appear promising.
During the current installment of the OSCE agreement, Russia has succeeded
in moving a mere six trains full of equipment over the entire 12-month period.
(INFOTAG, 10 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1210, via World News Connection) Adding
to the excuses for the lack of progress in the Transdniestr, Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov cited cost (approximately $48 million) as the primary
obstacle in removal of the ammunition. Ivanov went on to add, "Protests
by the local people and opposition by Dniestr authorities complicate the
process." (INFOTAG, 9 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1209, via World News Connection)
The full array of Russian pretexts, ranging from cost to opposition by
the Transdniestr population, may serve to entertain (or distract) some observers,
yet those who seek the truth might be better advised to search elsewhere
for salient information. A sampling of somewhat more plausible excuses
for the lack of progress in the region might include black market profiteering,
or the increasingly evident attempts by Russia to keep a military foothold
in the "door to the Balkans," especially with Romania's candidature
for NATO membership.
Ship 'em out we'll make more!
According to the Moldovan security services, Transdniestr is not just
a place to store weapons and ammunition, but also serves as home to a relatively
robust weapons manufacturing (exporting?) industry. A Moldovan report filed
at the recent OSCE summit charged that the Russian manufacturing giant Pribor
(located in the Transdniestr) has produced over 50 missile launchers which
can be mounted on ZIL-131 and URAL-365 trucks. Twenty of these systems
allegedly are in use by the Transdniestr military forces, with the remainder
believed to be in service in Georgia's secessionist statelet of Abkhazia.
(BASA-PRESS, 4 Dec 02; via Moldova AZI) Remnants of the Russian
defense companies Eletromas, Metalorukav and Kirov are believed to be producing
pistols, assault rifles, portable missile launchers and anti-personnel mines
that are sold in turn (from the Transdniestr) to other "disputed"
regions (secessionists from Georgia). Vyacheslav Sapronov, chief
of the so-called Transdniestr Industrial Complex, predictably denounced
Moldova's accusations as unfounded, and went on to add that such charges
were aimed "not only at Tiraspol, but at Moscow as well." (MOLDOVA
AZI, 6 Dec 02)
New ministers, new weapons, and a new deadline for the thus far unimpressive
Russian exodus from the Transdniestr -- claims of a quest for reintegration
and stabilization may dominate the rhetoric; however, stagnation seems to
depict more accurately the situation on the ground. If the status quo is
maintained, the Transdniestr capability to produce and distribute weapons
may continue to outperform Russia's demonstrated lack of willingness to
remove its ammunition and soldiers from the region.
by Scott Fleeher (gunpilot@military.com)
CAUCASUS
CHECHNYA
New publications concerning the 1999 explosions
Novaya gazeta recently published two important documents concerning
the 1999 explosions in Russian apartment buildings. The emergence of the
documents -- a letter from Yusuf Krymshamkhalov and Timur Batchaev, who
are suspects in the case, and transcripts of interviews with GRU agent Aleksei
Galkin - suggests that the public commission formed last summer to investigate
these crimes is making progress, and that Russia's liberal circles refuse
to give up the quest to establish the truth about the bombings. (An archive
of articles and documents can be found on the Somnenie (Doubt) web page:
www.somnenie.narod.ru/sent.html)
On 9 December, Novaya gazeta published an open letter in which Krymshamkhalov
and Batchaev confess to bringing sacks of explosives to the Moscow apartment
buildings affected and contend that their superiors and organizers were
agents of the FSB. On 6 December Batchaev was killed in a shootout with
Georgian policemen; on 7 December Krymshamkhalov was arrested and brought
to Lefortovo prison in Moscow. (See Georgia section below.)
The letter is addressed to the public commission which is conducting
an independent investigation into the bombings. In it, Krymshamkhalov and
Batchaev state
" 1. We admit we were accomplices (souchastniki) in the terrorist
acts which occurred in Moscow and Volgadonsk in September 1999. We state
that we did not know Khattab, Basaev, or any of the Chechen field commanders
or political leaders, and in general none of the Chechens had anything to
do with the September 1999 terrorist acts. They did not order these acts,
finance them, or organize them.
2. We are accomplices to the explosions on the lowest level and have
nothing to do with setting the explosions. We transported the bags of explosives.
We thought they would be stored and used later against administrative buildings
of the military and the security services, not against apartment buildings.
We could not have guessed that the explosions would occur in the buildings
where the explosives were stored. We did not know in advance when the explosions
would occur."
The letter goes on to say that the organizers were a Tatar named Abubakar
and Max Lazovsky, the head of a criminal group in Moscow and an FSB agent.
The letter was provided by the American historian Yuri Felshtinsky, who
apparently had a long correspondence with the two suspects. The two reportedly
promised Felshtinsky that they would tell all on videotape if he agreed
to pay them $3 million. He refused, saying that purchased information is
useless to him. Felshtinsky formed the impression that the two men were
being held captive and were controlled tightly by others, probably by Chechen
fighters. When Krymshamkhalov and Batchaev found out about the explosions,
they escaped to Chechnya and had to rely on Chechen commanders for security,
Felshtinsky reasons. It is a strange coincidence that one of the two men
was killed and the other was apprehended just as the Novaya gazeta issue
containing their statement was going to press.
On 2 December, Novaya gazeta published the full text of an interview
with GRU agent Alexei Galkin and a video in which he claimed that the FSB
and GRU were responsible for the explosions. Galkin had been taken prisoner
in Chechnya as the second Chechen war was starting and the video was produced
while he was in captivity in Grozny in December 1999. (An excerpt of this
interview appeared earlier in an article by Helen Womack in THE INDEPENDENT,
6 Jan 00) Galkin survived the ordeal and escaped from his Chechen captors
in the winter of 2000. After nearly a year of medical treatment and rehabilitation
he retired from the service in the summer of 2002. In November 2002 he
granted an interview to Novaya gazeta, which published it together with
the transcript of the 1999 video.
On the video he said:
Galkin: I personally was not involved in the explosions in Moscow and
Daghestan. But I know who conducted the explosions, who is behind the explosions
in Moscow, and who conducted the explosions in Daghestan.
Journalist: Can you say who?
Galkin: The Russian Security Services, the FSB working together with
the GRU, are responsible for the explosions in Moscow and Volgadonsk. The
explosion in Buinaksk is the work of our group that is now working in Daghestan.
Journalist: are you speaking on your own free will?
Abu Movsaev (his captor): You don't have to answer.
Journalist: How are you being treated here?
Galkin: I am being treated well. As a military prisoner I am given three
meals a day, I am not beaten, and I have been given medical treatment.
Journalist: There is a written statement. Do you confirm that you made
this statement?
Galkin: This statement was typed from my words. (Holds the paper closer)
I wrote this statement by hand and it bears my signature.
In the recent interview with Novaya gazeta, Galkin explained that, in
fact, he was held in abominable conditions without food or water and was
subject to regular beatings. During interrogations Abu Movsaev, a Chechen
commander, would beat him until he gave the right answers. Galkin says
that he was threatened into compliance. Two Russian soldiers were beheaded
in front of him. Then he was told that another GRU officer and a Chechen
companion who were captured together with Galkin would be beheaded. He
also was told that harm would come to his family.
Interestingly, amid a long detailed narrative of his travails, Galkin
never actually touches on the subject of the bombings. Galkin never explicitly
repudiates the statements he made earlier. He says that they were made
under duress, which is also evident from the transcript of the video. In
his interview he does not say that the Chechens told him what to say nor
does he comment in any way on the bombings themselves.
Coerced repatriation
Russian authorities insist that the repatriation of refugees from tent
camps in Ingushetia to Chechnya is proceeding in a voluntary manner. In
fact, federal authorities are coercing the refugees, albeit without the
use of physical force. A detailed report of the Russian Human Rights Center
Memorial last updated on 2 December (WWW.MEMO.RU) describes the repatriation
process and the conditions in each camp.
In May 2002 the authorities announced the decision to close down all
the refugee camps in Ingushetia and repatriate the refugees to Chechnya
by the end of September. In the summer all food shipments from the government
were stopped, although international donors continued to provide rations.
Then two camps in Chechnya close to the Ingush border were dismantled.
Then the camps in Ingushetia were told to drop names from their registration
rolls. From some camps refugees then started returning to Chechnya. In
other camps family members shared rations so that those dropped from the
registration rolls would not have to leave. Then gas deliveries were stopped
or continued erratically, leaving the inhabitants with no heat. Russian
threats, such as being told "today you can drive away, later you will
be running," also have been reported. The first camp, "Iman,"
was dismantled on 2 December. The other camps were put on notice that they
too would be closed before 20 December.
Security concerns are the main reason why refugees refuse to return to
Chechnya. In principle, shelter, water and heat can be provided in Chechnya,
although no suitable accommodations have been built so far. The main obstacle
to repatriation is that Chechnya remains very dangerous for Chechen civilians
who are regularly rounded up in haphazard "cleansing" operations
and are subject to torture, "disappearances" and extra-judicial
executions. The Memorial report cites a pro-Russian Chechen administration
official, Rudnik Dudaev, who says that 100 persons disappeared in November.
The eviction process has been accompanied by a radical reduction in the
official count of refugees. Whereas the figure of 145,000 Chechen refugees
in Ingushetia was the benchmark for many months, suddenly the official estimate
was reduced to 60,000. In the materials Memorial has gathered, each camp
administration was told to report a lower number of refugees, thereby denying
registration to hundreds of persons.
The reliable numbers are as follows. Roughly 362,000 persons lost their
homes in Chechnya as a result of the present war. Approximately 197,000
remained in Chechnya. Of them, 12,000 are living in camps, whereas the
remainder are living with friends and family. Roughly 145,000 are in Ingushetia
30,000 in tent camps, 32,000 in rented spaces and the remainder with
friends and family. According to the migration service, about 20,000 Chechen
refugees migrated to other parts of Russia. Only 12,500 former residents
of Chechnya have been registered as "forced migrants," which entitles
them to compensation and social services; of this number, the majority are
not Chechens but members of other nationalities who lived in Chechnya before
the war.
GEORGIA
Where was Yusup Krymshamkhalov arrested?
Russian media report that Yusup Krymshamkhalov - who (as mentioned earlier)
was wanted in connection with the bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow
and Volgadonsk in September 1999 - was apprehended in Georgia's Pankisi
Gorge and extradited to Russia on 7 December. However, Georgia's justice
and security ministries deny that Krymshamkhalov, an ethnic Karachai, ever
had been to Georgia. (WWW.CIVIL.GE, 9 Dec 02, and PRIME NEWS, 8 Dec 02;
BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) On 11 December, Georgia's
Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili said that Krymshamkhalov was arrested
in Stavropol and Georgia's role was limited to providing information leading
to his arrest. (PRIME NEWS, 11 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging
Markets Database)
According to the Georgian press, there was an incident involving Karachai
gunmen who are known to be Krymshamkhalov's associates. Four members of
a five-person gang were killed during a shootout with police on 6 December.
The fifth died later in a hospital. Three gang members - Tagir Bedzhiev,
Timur Batchaev and Rashid Khudiev - were ethnic Karachai, residents of Karachai-Cherkessia.
The two other gang members were identified only as local guides. (GEORGIAN
TELEVISION, 7 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
Batchaev was wanted by Russia's law enforcement agencies as a suspect in
the 1999 bombings of apartment buildings in Russian cities. However, Krymshamkhalov
was not mentioned in the Georgian press and may have been apprehended in
a different operation. According to the initial reports, the group set
out from the Lagodekhi district and was driving a Mercedes towards the Azerbaijani
border. All five members of the gang died as a result of the confrontation
with police.
How to please Putin
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
recently applauded Georgia for the "cleansing" operations it had
conducted against Chechens in Georgia. In previous months Sergei Ivanov
had been among the most vocal advocates of Russia launching operations against
Georgia, but now he sounds pleased. "I cannot but praise the actions
of the security services of Georgia, which arrested recently one of the
organizers of the 1999 acts of terrorism in Moscow and Volgodonsk,"
Ivanov said. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets
Database) Putin lauded the Georgians for "destroying the most odious
terrorists." (RIA, 9 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets
Database) Apparently, the Georgian leadership has given in to Russian pressure
and has started to round up and register ethnic Chechens.
At dawn on 7 December, ethnic Chechens were detained in their homes and
entire families were taken into police custody. "The point is that
not only Chechen refugees are being arrested but also Chechens who are Georgian
citizens," a Georgian television network reported. (RUSTAVI-2, 7 Dec
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The Georgian police
working jointly with the Russian FSB neither presented arrest warrants nor
allowed lawyers representing some of the Chechens into the police stations.
(WWW.CIVIL.GE, 9 Dec 02) These operations were conducted not only in Tbilisi
but in several other towns, including Kutaisi, Tsqaltubo, Samtredia and
other parts of western Georgia (Imereti). (GEORGIAN RADIO, 9 Dec 02; BBC
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) All the arrested persons,
including children, were fingerprinted and photographed. Reportedly dozens
were arrested in Tbilisi alone, but there is no exact count and it is not
clear how many remain in detention. In his comments to the press President
Eduard Shevardnadze took pains to emphasize the sweeps were "not directed
against the Chechens." Rather the purpose of the sweeps was to identify
illegal immigrants who may "inflame the situation," or carry out
"large-scale acts of terrorism in Tbilisi" or perhaps "stage
an act of terrorism against the head of state." (GEORGIAN RADIO,
9 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
by Miriam Lanskoy
CENTRAL ASIA
Reestablishing Russian hegemony?
The "campaign against terrorism" takes a myriad of forms and
is nebulous enough to allow creative interpretation as to what it constitutes.
Much of the recent political positioning in Central Asia (or globally,
for that matter) can be justified as part of the "campaign against
terrorism," regardless of its relevance to such a campaign. Wherever
power and hegemony are at stake, rationales that palliate the populace are
most attractive, even if logic suggests less benevolent reasons for the
actions of a particular country.
During his recent visit to Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin
noted the high priority that his administration places on Russian-Kyrgyz
relations, reaffirming political support for Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev
and a desire to continue close relations in the social, economic and military
sectors. Putin commended the Kyrgyz policy of supporting Russian as a second
official language and pledged his support for educational policies aimed
at furthering a shared linguistic tradition. (ITAR-TASS, 1928 GMT, 5 Dec
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1205, via World News Connection) Akaev, for his part,
revealed his desire for Kyrgyzstan to be the "main strategic partner"
for Russian interests in Central Asia. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 Dec 02)
Over the past few years, the Kyrgyz government had requested the establishment
of Russia military installations in Kyrgyzstan, (TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA,
12 Dec 02; via www.times.kg) but it was only recently that Moscow acquiesced.
One explanation for the decision is that reestablishing a hegemonic presence
in Central Asia is in Russia's political interests, since it provides leverage
in negotiations concerning the region and serves to limit the influence
of the US military presence. Domestic issues within Kyrgyzstan clearly
motivate Bishkek.
The Akaev government has been threatened by opposition protests. These
protests have become so troublesome to the administration that it has proposed
a one- to two-year moratorium on unsanctioned demonstrations and gatherings.
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 4 Dec 02) The Russian presence may give Akaev's administration
the support it needs to help keep the political opposition at bay. This,
of course, has not quieted the protests; opposition leader Topchubek Turgunaliev
has referred to Akaev's support for the Russian deployment as "a betrayal
of [the] state's interests." Continuing to express his views on Akaev's
control of power and the willingness to embrace Russia, Turguanaliev added
that "Akaev can try to find a way out, but enough people have lost
faith in him that he won't be able to survive long in Kyrgyzstan."
(EURASIANET, 11 Dec 02; via www.eurasianet.org)
At the same time that Russia is increasing its presence in Kyrgyzstan
and Akaev is facing numerous challenges from opposition parties, the United
States has indicated its plans to expand cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. US
aid to the region is expected to double in 2003 and military operations
at the Ganci air base (Manas airport, 10 km north of Bishkek and approximately
30 km west of the Kant airbase) also are expected to increase. (EURASIANET,
5 Dec 02; via www.euraisanet.org) Akaev has given tacit support for the
US presence and has pledged that the US bases may remain in Kyrgyzstan for
the length of the UN mandate. (ITAR-TASS, 1544 GMT, 5 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1205,
via World News Connection)
While the Akaev government supports both the US and Russian presence,
a recent poll conducted by the Information Support Fund in Bishkek found
that, though 45 percent of those polled were neutral regarding the US presence,
only 18 percent supported the US base whereas 34 percent opposed it. (EURASIANET,
5 Dec 02; via www.eurasianet.org) The local population's general disappointment
with the US military presence is tied largely to unrealized expectations;
most expected to benefit economically from the US presence. And while that
presence has yielded economic benefits to the country, these benefits have
been isolated to very few individuals.
US troops have been conscious of this and have made efforts to assist
communities near the base by donating clothing, repairing schools and improving
the local water systems. (EURASIANET, 5 Dec 02; via www.eurasianet.org)
Though there is a history of tensions between the Russians and Kyrgyz,
locals have lower expectations of the Russian forces and it is likely that
their presence at the Kant air base will be less obtrusive to the people
around Bishkek. With a large population of Russians and a history as one
of the agricultural and industrial centers of Kyrgyzstan during Soviet times,
Kant is considered a Russian village. Soviet troops used the air base for
training, giving Russian troops familiarity with the region and renewing
the village's familiarity with a Russian military presence. Furthermore,
Russians can more easily blend into the community, both culturally and linguistically.
Fighting terrorism: Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
Some of the Russian troops deployed in Kant came from Tajikistan, where
the Russian military has maintained an active presence since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. When Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov met with US
President George W. Bush and other high-ranking government officials on
a recent state visit, he expressed his concern about the delay of international
financial assistance to Afghanistan, suggesting that it could delay normalization
and stability. (ITAR-TASS, 0725 GMT, 10 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1210, via
World News Connection) Rakhmonov added that, though Tajikistan was willing
"to cooperate with any country,Russia has been and will always be its
strategic partner." (ITAR-TASS, 1419 GMT, 10 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1210,
via World News Connection) And while Rakhmonov was in Washington, Russian
businessmen and representatives from the Business Council of the Eurasian
Economic Community were meeting in Dushanbe to discuss ways to further Russian-Tajik
economic relations. (ITAR-TASS, 1952 GMT, 9 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1209,
via World News Connection) Clearly Russia remains intent on expanding its
sphere of influence in Central Asia.
Perhaps the most telling aspect of Russia's role in the region and the
interpretation of the recent troop deployment to Kyrgyzstan came out of
Uzbekistan. While Uzbekistan has long sought to be the region's hegemonist,
Uzbek President Islam Karimov was quoted as saying that a "military
rivalry between the great powers in an overheated region is counterproductive."
Although Karimov further noted Russia's importance to the region, (RFE/RL
NEWSLINE, 13 Dec 02) there is no doubt that Russia's presence in Kyrgyzstan
reaffirms Russia's role in Central Asia and complicates the "campaign
against terrorism" at a time when attempts to negotiate the delimitation
of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border recently failed (yet again) (INTERFAX, 1035 GMT,
10 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1210, via World News Connection) and the Akaev
government is particularly threatened by opposition leaders.
by David W. Montgomery (dwm@bu.edu)
