Raising the Cost of Spam

Someone, somewhere, must be buying what the spammers are selling. Otherwise, the trouble of sending volumes of spam simply wouldn’t be worth it. It is exactly that equation that information economist Marshall Van Alstyne wants to tilt in favor of those who would just as soon never get one more message about herbal Viagra.

Van Alstyne wants to make the spammers pay, literally. The idea stems from a fundamental principle of economics developed by Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase to solve the pollution problem. Prior to his work, large companies polluted the air and water, but the ill effects never hit their bottom line. By assigning a value to clean air and water, he theorized, polluting air and water would become costly to the polluters.

Applying this to spam means that if a person receives unwanted spam in her in-box, the spammer pays. If spammers must compensate those customers disturbed by their messages, spamming won’t stay profitable. Van Alstyne and his colleagues have designed a mathematical model to test this theory, and the results are positive — messages from illegitimate senders drop off dramatically.

Eliminating spam in other ways is complicated. Software filters and white lists inevitably engender escalation — the better the technology the more creative spammers become in outwitting it. Filters also remove unanticipated messages that may contain information of value to the recipient — information from political candidates, a first contact from a new colleague, or news about a community effort.

To account for the fact that different people will respond differently to unsolicited messages, Van Alstyne’s approach returns control of the in-box to the recipient. Because technology cannot differentiate spam from unexpected but valuable messages, Van Alstyne’s solution allows humans to make the distinction. The burden lies with both the sender and receiver. Essentially, spammers agree not to send spam. If they do, they must pay, but only if the receiver cashes in.

The system works within the framework of existing e-mail accounts which, for the most part, already have approved-sender lists. When a message comes in from a sender not on the list, Van Alstyne’s system challenges the message. For the message to get through, the sender must post a bond, placing about five cents aside for the receiver. If the message is spam, the receiver can cash in the bond with a mouse click. This action transfers the bond money into an account managed by the receiver’s ISP or employer. It also signals the sender that future messages will likely cost money. If the receiver ignores the bond, it expires after a few days and the sender can assume the receiver may be interested in future messages.

Van Alstyne and his team have filed for a patent on their idea and are working to define open standards for such a system. Several companies are working to implement it. Soon, if you get interrupted by spam, you can make sure the spammer pays.

For more information see: http://smgnet.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html

— Elizabeth Dougherty

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